In a recent study Selman and Kautz proposed a method, called Horn approximation, for speeding up inference in propositional Knowledge Bases. Their technique is based on the compilation of a propositional formula into a pair of Horn formulae: a Horn Greatest Lower Bound (GLB) and a Horn Least Upper Bound (LUB). In this paper we address two questions that have been only marginally addressed so far: 1) what is the semantics of the Horn approximations? 2) what is the exact complexity of nding Horn approximations? We obtain semantical as well as computational results. The major results of the former kind are: Horn GLBs are closely related to models of the circumscription; reasoning wrt the Horn LUB can be mapped into classical reasoning. The major results of the latter kind are: nding a Horn GLB is \mildly" harder than solving the original inference problem; nding the Horn LUB is a search problem that cannot be parallelized. We believe that our results provide useful criteria that may help nding a knowledge compilation policy.
Introduction
In a recent study Selman and Kautz, 1991; Kautz and Selman, 1992] Selman and Kautz proposed a method, called Horn approximation, for speeding up inference in propositional Knowledge Bases. Propositional inference is the problem of checking whether j = holds, where and are propositional formulae. The starting point of their technique stems from the fact that inference for general propositional formulae is co-NPcomplete |hence polynomially unfeasible| while it is doable in polynomial time when is a Horn formula. The fascinating question they address is the following: is it possible to compile a propositional formula into The importance of having compiled forms of a Knowledge Base is in that sometimes we can use them for providing a quick answer to an inference problem. As an example, if we are faced with the problem of checking j = , we may bene t from the fact that for any Horn LB lb of , lb 6 j = implies 6 j = . lb is therefore a complete approximation of . Dually, a Horn UB ub is a sound approximation of , since ub j = implies j = .
Selman and Kautz notice that some complete approximations are better than others. In the previous example, both lb1 
ub2 is a Horn LUB of . Selman and Kautz's proposal is to approximate inference wrt a propositional formula by using its Horn GLBs and LUBs. In this way inference could be unsound or incomplete, but it is anyway possible to spend more time and use a general inference procedure to determine the answer directly from the original formula. The general inference procedure could still use the approximations to prune its search space (see Selman and Kautz, 1991, page 905] Horn approximations have two computational problems: 1) computing them is an NP-hard task and 2) due to its exponential size, it may be impossible to store the Horn LUB. About the rst aspect Selman and Kautz notice that since approximations could be computed o -line, the computational cost of nding them will be amortized over the total set of subsequent queries to the Knowledge Base. With respect to the second aspect, they propose in Kautz and Selman, 1992] a technique for \compressing" the Horn LUB into a (quasi-)equivalent formula. Due to reasons related to circuit complexity theory, it is not possible to apply the technique in general (see Kautz and Selman, 1992] for further details).
Other computational properties of Horn approximations are studied in Greiner and Schuurmans, 1992; Roth, 1993] . In this paper we address two important questions that have not been addressed so far:
1. is it possible to describe Horn approximations with a semantics that does not rely on the syntactic notion of Horn clause? 2. what is the exact complexity of nding Horn approximations?
An answer to the rst question shows the exact meaning of the approximate answers. An answer to the second question tells in which cases it is reasonable |from the computational point of view| to use Horn approximations. We obtain two di erent kinds of results: semantical Horn GLBs of are closely related to models of the circumscription of ; reasoning wrt Horn GLBs is the same as reasoning by counterexamples using only minimal models; while skeptical reasoning wrt the Horn GLBs of a formula is the same as ordinary reasoning wrt , brave reasoning wrt the Horn GLBs of is the same as reasoning wrt CIRC( ); compiling more knowledge does not always give better Horn GLBs; reasoning wrt the Horn LUB can be mapped into classical reasoning; the Horn LUB of is related to CWA( ). computational nding a Horn GLB is \mildly" harder than solving the original inference problem; reasoning wrt the Horn LUB is exactly as hard as solving the original inference problem; nding a Horn UB is a search problem that cannot be parallelized. We believe that our results provide useful criteria that may help nding a knowledge compilation policy. In particular, we show that an interesting tradeo seems to emerge between the computation done during the compilation time and the computation done during the query answering time. The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 and 3 we study Horn GLBs and LUBs, respectively; we discuss our results in Section 4.
Horn GLBs
In this section denotes a propositional formula and glb denotes one of its Horn GLBs. We assume that both of them are in CNF. We start with some considerations on the syntactic form of Horn GLBs.
In . As noticed in Selman and Kautz, 1991, Lemma 2], every clause in glb is a Horn-strengthening (i. e. a \witness") of a clause in . On the other hand we can easily prove that for each clause in there is at least one Hornstrengthening (\witness") in glb . In the following two subsections we prove that Horn GLBs of a formula are closely related to the minimal models of . Minimal models of a propositional formula have the property that the set of atoms that they map into 1 is minimal. More formally (see Lifschitz, 1985] ), given two models M; N of a formula, we write M N i fxj M(x) = 1g fxj N(x) = 1g and we write M < N i the containment is strict. The models of a formula that are minimal in this preorder are called the minimal models of . Minimal models are important in the theory of non-monotonic reasoning, since they are the semantical counterpart of circumscription McCarthy, 1980; Lifschitz, 1985] : The models of CIRC( ) are exactly the minimal models of .
We recall that Horn formulae have a unique minimal model (the minimum model).
From GLBs to minimal models
Let be a propositional formula and glb a Horn GLB of . We prove that the minimum model M of glb is minimal for , thus proving that if a Horn GLB of is known, then it is possible to obtain in linear time a minimal model of (see Dowling and Gallier, 1984] ).
First of all we notice that M is also a model of . Now, let's assume that M is not minimal, and let N be a model of such that N < M. We prove that we can build a Horn formula U such that M( glb ) M(U) M( ), thus contradicting the assumption that glb is a Horn GLB of .
The Horn formula U is built as follows: Since U is a collection of Horn-strengthenings of , M(U) M( ) holds. It is easy to prove that N is a model of U: 1) N clearly satis es all the clauses in U that come from marked clauses of ; 2) N must satisfy at least one negative literal of each clause 0 in U that comes from an unmarked clause of , otherwise would have been marked. Now we prove that M( glb ) M(U) holds. Since N 2 M(U) and N 6 2 M( glb ), it is su cient to prove that M( glb ) M(U). Let's take a generic model P of glb ; we prove that it is also a model of U. Since P is a model of glb , M < P must hold, hence N < P holds too. As a consequence P satis es all the clauses in U that come form marked clauses of . As far as the other clauses of U are concerned, they are clauses of glb as well, therefore P satis es all of them.
The following theorem summarizes the above result.
Theorem 1 Let be a propositional formula and glb a Horn GLB of . The minimum model of glb is minimal for . Theorem 1 implies that if we have a Horn GLB of , then we can obtain in linear time (see Dowling and Gallier, 1984 ]) a minimal model of . More technically, the theorem shows a polynomial reduction from the search problem of nding a minimal model of to the search problem of nding a Horn GLB of . The present author analyzed in Cadoli, 1992 ] the computational complexity of the search problem of nding a minimal model of a propositional formula. One of the results of that paper is that nding a minimal model of a formula is hard (using many-one reductions) with respect to the class P NP O(log n)] .
1
It is important to remark that P NP O(log n)] -hard problems are in a precise sense computationally harder than NP-complete or co-NP-complete problems 2 . We recall that the problem of deciding whether j = holds is co-NP-complete.
As shown in Cadoli, 1992] , P NP O(log n)] -hardness of nding a minimal model holds even if a model of is known. This fact can be compared with a consideration in Selman and Kautz, 1991, Theorem 1]: glb is satis able i is satis able, hence nding a Horn GLB is NP-hard. We can now say that even if we know that is satis able and have one of its models in hand, nding a Horn GLB is still P NP O(log n)] -hard. We recall that nding a model (not necessarily minimal) of a propositional formula is per se an NP-hard task.
Corollary 2 Finding a Horn GLB of a propositional formula is P NP O(log n)] -hard. This holds even if a model of is already known. We notice that the above corollary gives us just a lower bound. It is reasonable to ask how easy is to nd a Horn GLB, i. e. to give an upper bound to the problem. In Selman and Kautz, 1991] an algorithm for computing a Horn GLB of a formula is shown. The algorithm performs an exponential number of polynomial steps. It is possible to show that a Horn GLB can be found in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine with access to an NP oracle, i. e. to prove that the problem is in the class P NP . This means that we only need a polynomial number of queries to the GLB in order to \pay o " the overhead of the knowledge compilation.
From minimal models to GLBs
We now show that if we have a minimal model M of a formula , then we can easily build a very good approximation of a Horn GLB of . In particular we show that we can build in linear time a Horn LB of whose minimum model is M. This result allows us to perform, in 1 P NP O(log n)] is the class of decision problems that can be computed by a polynomial-time deterministic machine which can use for free an oracle (or subroutine) that answers a set of NP-complete queries (e. g. satis ability checks) whose cardinality is bound by a logarithmic function. We refer the reader to Johnson, 1990 ] for a thorough description of all the complexity classes that are cited in this paper.
the following subsection, some interesting considerations on the semantics of Horn GLBs.
We build a Horn LB W of , whose minimum model is M. Moreover, we prove that there is a Horn GLB of whose minimum model is also M. W is built as follows: It is easy to prove that M is the minimum model of V : all of the models of V must be greater or equal than its minimum model; since M is a model of V and no model of is smaller than M, M is the minimum model of V .
Theorem 3 Let M be a minimal model of . There is a Horn GLB of whose minimum model is M.
Semantical consequences
Theorems 1 and 3 can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 4 The set of minimal models of a formula and the set of minimum models of the Horn GLBs of are the same. We now address some interesting semantical consequences of the above results. As noticed in Selman and Kautz, 1991] a traditional AI approach is reasoning by counterexamples, which consists in refuting a possible consequence of a theory by means of a suitable model that contradicts it (an example of this technique is in the early work Gelernter, 1959] ). This approach is based on the well-known property M 6 j = =) 6 j = , that holds for any pair of formulae , and any model M of . Selman and Kautz indicate that reasoning under a speci c Horn GLB is an improved version of such a reasoning schema, since a single Horn GLB captures a set of models of the original theory. Using Theorem 4 and the well-known fact that the minimum model of a Horn formula completely characterizes the set of its positive consequences, we can say that, as far as positive theorems are concerned, reasoning under Horn GLBs is the same as reasoning by counterexamples using only minimal models. This does not hold for negative theorems. Selman and Kautz address brie y the issue of how reasoning with respect to a set of Horn GLBs looks like, proving Selman and Kautz, 1991, Theorem 3 ] that a formula is equivalent to the disjunction of all its Horn GLBs. The notions of skeptical and brave reasoning are frequently used in the literature. We say that a formula skeptically follows from the Horn GLBs of a formula (written skep?glb( )` ) if for each of its Horn GLBs glb it holds glb j = . We also say that bravely follows (written brave?glb( )` ) if there exists a Horn GLB glb such that glb j = .
The result by Selman and Kautz can be rephrased in the following way: skep?glb( )` i j = . Using Theorems 1 and 3 we can say that | as far as positive theorems are concerned | brave reasoning wrt Horn GLBs is the same as brave reasoning wrt minimal models. More precisely let be a positive clause, brave?glb( )` i there exists a minimal model M of s. t. M j = , i. e. i CIRC( ) 6 j = : (see Lifschitz, 1985] ). Using a result shown in Eiter and Gottlob, 1991] we can say that brave reasoning wrt Horn GLBs is a decision problem which is hard wrt the class p 2 of the polynomial hierarchy. Let us see how the relation with non-monotonicity just shown a ects approximate inference under Horn GLBs. We consider two knowledge bases ; We recall that reasoning using a generic Horn GLB is complete and unsound wrt reasoning using the original formula. In other words if brave?glb( ) 6 then we know that 6 j = , i. e. is disproved. Proposition 5 says that if we are able to disprove a formula using any complete compilation of a \small" formula , then we are not guaranteed that we are able to disprove using a generic complete compilation of a \bigger" formula 
Horn LUB
In this section denotes a propositional formula and lub denotes its Horn LUB. As shown in Kautz and Selman, 1992 ] in general it is not possible to store e ciently the Horn LUB of . In particular the size of lub can be exponential in the size of , and this seems to be independent on the representation used for lub (see Kautz and Selman, 1992] for further details). As a consequence any method for e ciently representing the Horn LUB is incomplete. In Selman and Kautz, 1991, page 3.1 Horn UBs with a limited number of clauses lub is logically equivalent to the conjunction of all the Horn prime implicates of Selman and Kautz, 1991, Theorem 4]. lub therefore guarantees sound and complete reasoning wrt as far as inference of Horn formulae is concerned: for all Horn formulae , ( lub j = ) i ( j = ). One natural choice is to approximate lub with a formula that guarantees sound and complete reasoning wrt as far as inference of short Horn formulae is concerned. As an example of this kind of approximation, we de ne the formula 1 ub to be the conjunction of the formulae in the set fxj x is a positive literal and j = xg.
Notice that 1 ub is a Horn UB of . This formula is a reasonable approximation of , since 1) at least all the positive atomic queries are answered correctly and 2) it has a nice short representation.
An interesting question is the following: how di cult is to obtain 1 ub ? We notice that nding 1 ub is the search problem that amounts to decide for each propositional variable x occurring in whether j = x holds. It is well known that just deciding j = x for a single propositional variable is co-NP-complete, but it is important to understand if the task of deciding j = x for many propositional variables can be parallelized. In other words we are interested in the following practical problem: is it possible to obtain 1 ub with one |or few| queries to a propositional theorem prover, or is it the case that the best strategy is just to ask separately for each propositional variable x of whether j = x holds? Clearly if it is possible to parallelize the process of building 1 ub |or any other approximation of lub | then we have better chances to obtain good approximations of lub .
Several authors (see for example Beigel, 1988; Krentel, 1988] ) studied the computational complexity of search problems of the kind we are addressing here. The goal of the research in this eld is to understand \how much NP-hardness" does an NP-hard problem contain. The problem QUERY, which is a generalization of the standard satis ability problem SAT, is de ned in Krentel, 1988] . The input of QUERY are k propositional formulae T 1 ; : : : ; T k and its output are k bits b 1 ; : : : ; b k , where for any i (1 i k), b i = 1 if T i is satis able, and b i = 0 if T i is not satis able. Beigel shows in Beigel, 1988] that it is very unlikely that QUERY can be solved with less than k queries to a SAT oracle. In other words it seems that any strategy for solving QUERY cannot be better than solving independently the k corresponding SAT problems. A general property of this kind of NPhard problems (see Beigel, 1988] for further details) is that it is not possible to gain e ciency via parallelization.
QUERY can be immediately mapped into the problem of nding the approximation 1 ub of a given formula . Moreover the proof can be immediately adapted to the problem of nding any set of Horn prime implicates of . This result can be interpreted in the following way: the task of nding short approximations of lub |like for example 1 ub | contains \a lot of NP-hardness". There seems to be a direct correspondence between the size of the approximation and the computational e ort that we need to obtain it. As a consequence there is little hope to obtain good approximations of lub by performing few calls to a theorem prover.
3.2 How hard is to decide lub j = ?
In the previous subsection we addressed the issue of how hard is to compile , and in particular how hard is to obtain an approximation of lub . In this subsection we are interested in another computational property of lub : we want to know how hard is to reason wrt lub , regardless of the representation of this formula that we are currently storing in our memory. In other words we want to understand what is the exact complexity of deciding lub j = , assuming that the inputs are and .
We assume that the formula is in CNF. In particular, let be a clause :b 1 _ _ :b m _ a 1 _ _ a n , that we denote as ?! a 1 _ _a n , where is a shorthand for the conjunction b 1^ ^b m . It is not hard to prove that inference wrt lub can be mapped into classical inference. Let L be the set of letters that occur in , L 1 ; : : : ; L n be n disjoint sets of letters of the same arity of L and 1 ; : : : ; n be n duplicates of built on L 1 ; : : : ; L n , respectively. In an analogous way we de ne Summarizing all the results presented so far we can say that: 1. it is not possible to represent lub explicitly in the memory; 2. we can make lub partially explicit; this is doable o -line but it is more di cult than the original task of reasoning wrt ; 3. if we keep lub completely implicit then reasoning wrt it is exactly as hard as reasoning (on-line) wrt . An interesting tradeo therefore exists between the amount of compilation that we want to perform o -line and the amount of reasoning that we want to do on-line.
A semantical remark
Equation (1) gives a sound and complete characterization of inference wrt lub in terms of classical propositional inference. In this subsection we make a brief remark about the relation existing between Horn LUBs and closed-world assumption Reiter, 1978] .
Observation 6 Let M be the minimum model of lub .
M is the intersection of all the minimal models of . Therefore M is a model of i the closed-world assumption CWA( ) of is consistent. We notice that CWA( ) may be consistent even if is non-Horn: The CWA of :a _ b _ c is consistent. Relations between Horn LUBs and closed-world reasoning are implicit in the works Borgida and Etherington, 1989; Selman and Kautz, 1991] .
Discussion
The computational results that we have seen in Sections 2 and 3 show that when we deal with knowledge compilation there exists an interesting tradeo between computation during compile time (o -line) and computation during query-answering time (on-line).
In Section 2 we have seen that the computational e ort of nding a Horn GLB is justi ed only if a signi cant number of queries to it will be done. In particular we have seen that the compilation is more expensive than a set of query answering tasks. The size of such a set has a lower bound which is a function logarithmic in the size of the input and an upper bound which is a function polynomial in the size of the input.
In Section 3 we have obtained similar results, showing that high-quality Horn UBs need a signi cant computational e ort.
Since compilation causes anyway loss of information (either soundness or completeness), the computational e ort spent in the compilation must be compared to the quality of the inference obtained. It is an open issue to nd an adequate formal framework for comparing the two aspects.
